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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT BERRETT, et al., ) Supreme Court No._ 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) Court of Appeals No. 
) 910215-CA 
vs. ) 
) Priority No. 16 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE ) 
WESTERN RAILROAD, ) 
Defendant/Petitioner. ) 
OBJECTION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (the "Opinion") 
was issued on on April 3,1992. It was published at 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(4/21/92). A copy is attached as Appendix 1. 
JURISDICTION 
A. On April 3, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals decision was 
filed. 
B. No orders concerning a rehearing or extensions of time within 
which to petition for certiorari have been requested or made. 
C. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §§ 78-2-2 (3) (a) and (5) (1992). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 13,1983, a massive landslide began to move down the 
hillside in Spanish Fork Canyon, just downriver of the small town of 
Thistle. The slide progressed into the canyon and blocked the Spanish Fork 
River. A small lake formed that inundated and destroyed Thistle. The lake 
was approximately one hundred feet deep and remained for approximately 
six months until the slide was breached and the water receded. The town 
was thereafter designated a flood plain, and no one has been allowed to 
rebuild. Plaintiffs are the former inhabitants of Thistle. 
Plaintiffs claim that the landslide was caused by defendant's 
construction activities at the toe of the slide. In the late 1800's, a 
predecessor railroad made a cut near the toe of the slide in order to run its 
tracks up the canyon. Defendant subsequently made a second cut in the 
early 1900s and a final cut in 1951. Plaintiffs estimate that the total soil 
removed by these cuts amounted to between 10,000 and 15,000 cubic 
yards. In essence, plaintiffs claim that but not for the cuts made at the toe 
of the slide, the slide would not have occurred, or at least it would not have 
been as massive, and their homes would not have been destroyed. 
Defendant asserts that inasmuch as the slide began at the top and 
moved downward, the landslide would have occurred even if the soil had 
not been removed from the toe. Defendant therefore claims its actions 
were not the cause of the slide. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was originally set for trial in April of 1989. However, the 
trial was continued when the defendant answered Interrogatories 
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concerning previous litigation related to the slide in a misleading manner. 
Plaintiffs discovered through their own investigation that the defendant had 
in fact previously been sued by the Utah Railway for their negligence in the 
Thistle disaster. In January of 1989, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
compelled the defendant to produce the related information concerning the 
previous litigation. However, plaintiffs did not receive the requested 
documents until June of 1989. 
As a result of documents discovered from the compelled 
information, the importance of calling Dr. Shroder became obvious. 
Plaintiffs' counsel met with one of their expert witnesses, Dr. Olson, and 
reviewed reports written about the Thistle slide area. Plaintiffs' counsel 
agreed with Dr. Olson at that time to attempt to locate one of the authors, 
Dr, John F. Shroder, a geomorphologist and a recognized expert on the 
Thistle slide area. (See Opinion, p. 3.) In the summer of 1989, Dr. 
Shroder was in Yellowstone National Park, out of reach of the plaintiffs, 
researching the impact of the fires of 1988 on landslide potential. Upon 
returning from Yellowstone, Dr. Shroder contacted plaintiffs' counsel, and 
stated that he would be willing to testify as an expert in support of the 
position that defendant's activities at the toe of the slide were a cause in fact 
of the Thistle slide. On August 1,14 days before trial, the defendant was 
notified of plaintiffs intent to call Dr. Shroder as a witness. (See Opinion, 
p. 3) 
On August 2, 1989, the trial court held a hearing on motions 
concerning several issues, including the exclusion of expert witness Dr. 
Shroder. At this hearing, plaintiffs' counsel submitted to the trial court a 
letter dated July 12, 1989, from defense counsel, which stated in part: 
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We agreed to exchange exhibit lists no later than August 1, 1989. At 
that time, you will also supply us with your final witness list, 
including the identity of any depositions that you propose to read. 
As we have previously discussed, within two days of receiving your 
list, we will provide you with our final witness list. You advised me 
that as of July 12,1989, you had not identified with certainty those 
witnesses that you plan to call whose names do not appear in the 
latest draft of the pre-trial order. (See July 12, 1989 letter, 
Appendix 2.) 
Defendant's counsel suggested August 1, as the final day to receive 
the plaintiffs witness list, and plaintiffs' counsel stated this was acceptable. 
No pre-trial agreement had been entered .with the court, and no order 
stating when witness lists were to be exchanged was ever entered. (See 
Opinion, p. 2.) The defendant's proposed pretrial order suggested that the 
names of all witnesses to be called at trial, not already listed in the 
proposed pre-trial order, be delivered to opposing counsel and filed with 
the trial court at least ten days prior to trial. (See Opinion, p. 3.) 
The trial court held that, regardless of the July 12 letter or the 
proposed pre-trial order of the defendant, no witnesses listed after July 11, 
1989 (particularly Dr. Shroder) would be allowed to testify. (See Opinion, 
p. 3.) 
Trial commenced on or about August 14, 1989. Following a 12 day 
trial, the jury found that the activities of the railroad were not a cause in 
fact of the Thistle disaster. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for New Trial 
which was heard on January 3,1990 and denied. Plaintiffs appealed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the result, finding 
that the trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial error in 
excluding testimony from an expert witness. (See Opinion, p. 9.) The 
Court of Appeals remanded the action for a new trial. (See Opinion, p. 12.) 
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The defendant then petitioned for Writ of Certiorari. (See Defendant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED CERTIORARI 
SINCE THE APPELLATE COURT DID NOT DEPART FROM 
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1991) governs the 
consideration for Review of Certiorari. Review by Writ of Certiorari is 
not a matter of right. While Rule 46 is not an exhaustive hst of reasons for 
granting a Writ of Certiorari, it does indicate the type of issues the Court is 
willing to hear. The defendant's Petition does not fit into any of the listed 
reasons for granting certiorari. 
Rule 46 (a) and (b) deal with conflicting opinions. The Supreme 
Court of Utah will grant a Writ of Certiorari when a Court of Appeal's 
decision is in conflict with a decision rendered by the Supreme Court or 
another Appellate Court. The Defendant cites no authority, and the 
plaintiff finds no authority, which would evidence conflicting opinions. In 
addition, the defendant fails to even list an example of how the Appellate 
Court's decision would not be in line with former cases. 
Rule 46 (c) deals with the Appellate Court's departure from the 
accepted norm to excess. In this case, it is the defendant who seeks 
departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings. The Defendant 
relies only on 46(c) in its attempt to obtain a Writ of Certiorari. (See 
Defendants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 5.) The defendant boldly 
proclaims that the Appellate Court's decision is wrong or flawed, yet it 
fails to cite any Utah authority to support this contention. In fact, the 
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Appellate Court rendered its decision by relying upon Utah authority and 
upon basic, well-settled points of law. As in this case, the Supreme Court 
has ruled on these issues in previous cases. Dugan v. Jones. 615 P. 2d 1239 
(Utah 1980); Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital. 7 Utah 2d 
39, 318, P. 2d 330 (1957). When the Supreme Court has ruled on an issue 
and the Appellate Court is faithful in following the Court's decision, the 
Appellate Court cannot be said to have departed from the accepted norm. 
Writ of Certiorari, therefore, should not be granted. 
The defendant states no persuasive reason for granting of a Writ of 
Certiorari. In the absence of conflicting court decisions, along with a long 
settled question of law, the plaintiffs believe that Supreme Court 
consideration of these issues is unnecessary. 
II. THE APPELLATE COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE 
ISSUES BELOW, THEREFORE MAKING GRANT 
OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI UNNECESSARY. 
A. The Appellate Court Correctly Decided that the Lower 
Court had Abused its Discretion. The undisputed fact in this matter was 
that no pre-trial order was ever signed. The defendant's suggested pre-
trial order included a provision that all witnesses should be listed at least 
10 days prior to trial. The defendant's attorneys had suggested in a letter 
dated July, 12, 1989, that all witnesses should be listed by August 1,1989. 
(See July 12, letter, Appendix 2.) On August 1, When the defendants 
discovered that the plaintiffs had located Dr. Shroder, they immediately 
cried prejudice, and attempted to repudiate their own suggested pre-trial 
order and letters. Under these facts, the Appellate Court held "that absent 
an order creating a judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not 
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sanction a party by excluding its witnesses under Rule 37(b) (2)", (See 
Opinion, p. 9.) 
Throughout its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the defendant asserts 
that the Appellate Court is wrong or that its logic was flawed. To reach 
these conclusions, the defendant is forced to alter the meaning of the 
Appellate Court's words, or to ignore them altogether. In other instances, 
the defendant tries to create an issue where none exists. 
1. The Defendant Mistakenly States the Appellate Court 
Decided the Case as a "Discovery Ruling", not as a Case Management 
Decision. In its Statement of the Case, the defendant claims that "the 
Court erroneously (a) characterized the trial court's case management 
decision as a 'discovery ruling'..." (See Defendant's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, p. 5.) This is clearly a mistake designed to lead the Supreme 
Court in the wrong direction from the very beginning. 
The Appellate Court starts its discussion of the standard of review by 
revealing that this is a case management issue. "Trial courts have broad 
discretion in managing the cases assigned to their courts. We will not 
interfere with a trial court's case management unless its action amounts to 
an abuse of discretion." (See Opinion, p. 3.) Page 8 of the Court's 
Opinion is even more clear. "The preclusion of Dr. Schroder's testimony, 
however, was not an evidentiary ruling to which rule 103 would apply; it 
was a case management decision under the Rules of Civil Procedure." (See 
Opinion, p. 8.) 
After circuitously arguing that the lower courts ruling was a 
'discovery ruling', the defendant agrees that this is a case management 
issue. (See Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 9, 14.) The 
Defendant is correct, as was the Appellate Court. This is a case 
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management decision. However, the defendant, in this five page span says, 
"the holding is wrong," "the analysis is flawed," "flawed premise," "the 
Court of Appeals erroneously implies," "mistakenly concluded," and the 
"decision...is simply wrong." ("See Defendant's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, p. 9-14.) The Appellate Court's Opinion is not wrong. Based 
upon the facts and law as it is applied to this case, the Appellate Court was 
correct. 
2. The Defendant Attempts to characterize the Appellate 
Court's use of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26 (f) as Error Even Though 
the Decision Would Remain Unchanged if Rule 16 Were Applied. The 
outcome of the issue on appeal is the same if either a Rule 26 or Rule 16 
analysis is employed. As the defendant points out, Rule 16 incorporated 
rule 37 (b) by reference into the rule. On the other hand, Rule 37 (b) 
states that the sanctions are appropriate for an order entered under Rule 26 
(f). Following either rule would allow sanctions under Rule 37 for the 
violation of an order. 
The Appellate Court's Opinion at 10 states that no order was ever 
entered. Therefore, Rule 37 (b) sanctions were totally inapplicable and 
should not have been used. The Appellate Court goes further and 
establishes an abuse of discretion by the trial court which meets Rules 16, 
26, and 37 standards through Rule 61. 
B. The Exclusion of Dr. Shroder's Testimony Was 
Prejudicial Error. 
The primary issue in the case was whether the actions of the 
defendant at the toe of the Thistle slide was a cause of the slide which 
resulted in the loss of the plaintiffs' properties. Prior to the slide of 1983, 
Dr. John Shroder had written a thesis entitled Landslides of Utah, which 
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discussed the Thistle slide area in detail. Plaintiffs' counsel located Dr. 
Shroder in Omaha, Nebraska on or about July 19, 1989. The initial 
opinions that Dr. Shroder proffered to the plaintiffs were favorable, and 
therefore on August 1, the agreed date, he was listed as a witness. 
Immediately upon learning that the plaintiffs had located and listed Dr. 
Shroder as a witness, the defendant screamed that allowing him to testify 
would be prejudicial to them. The Court mistakenly agreed and excluded 
any witnesses not designated by July 11,1989. The plaintiffs did not use 
their limited resources to bring Dr. Shroder to Utah, nor to incur 
additional expense for the purpose of a proffer. The defendant now argues 
that regardless of the repudiation of its own written words, and regardless 
of its own position that allowing Dr. Shroder to testify would be 
prejudicial to its case, that the plaintiffs weren't prejudiced by the trial 
court's exclusion. The Appellate Court, at page 11, states, "Given 
defendant's own emphasis on the type of experts presented, we cannot say 
that the geomorphological credentials and testimony of Dr. Shroder would 
not have been helpful to the plaintiffs' case in this battle of expert 
witnesses." (See Opinion, p. 11.) 
1. The Defendant Seeks to Reverse the Holding of the 
Appellate Court...Erroneously Claiming that the Appellate Court Relied on 
Dicta in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Dav Saints Hospital. The 
Defendant's characterization of the Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter Day 
Saints Hospital, 318 P. 2d 330, holding as dicta is simply wrong. The 
determination of whether the evidence excluded was prejudicial to the 
plaintiff was the main issue on appeal in Joseph. The Court stated "(If) we 
cannot, with any degree of assurance, affirm that the use of such evidence 
would not have been helpful to the plaintiff, the doubt should be resolved 
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in favor of allowing him to have a full and fair presentation of his cause to 
the jury." Id. at 333. The Appellate Court properly relied on that 
language. 
The defendant argues in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at page 
15, that the Appellate Court holding requires the objecting party to carry 
the burden of establishing prejudicial error. Again, the defendant changes 
the words of the Opinion to suit its own needs. The defendant cites page 11 
of the Appellate Court's Opinion as the location of this idea. Nowhere in 
the Court's Opinion is it stated that the objecting party has the burden of 
establishing prejudicial error. 
The Appellate Court does imply that the objecting party may make 
statements on the record that can be used-in establishing prejudicial error. 
This is a far cry from carrying the burden of proof. The Appellate Court 
uses the defendant's own actions and words to show how the trial court's 
error was prejudicial to the plaintiffs. As a result of this embarrassment, 
the defendant claims that the burden was shifted, in a gross 
mischaracterization of the Appellate Court's Opinion. 
2. The Defendant Closes its Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
With a Utah Rule of Evidence Argument that is Inapplicable. The 
defendant closes its Petition for Writ of Certiorari by arguing that Utah 
Rules of Evidence 103 (1991) should apply in this case. The defendant 
makes this argument even after admitting that this was a case management 
decision and that Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 61 (1991) is the correct 
standard. 
Page 8 of the Appellate Court's Opinion explains clearly why Rule 
103 does not apply. The Court correctly states that this is a case 
management decision, not an evidentiary ruling. The Appellate Court says 
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that "(It) is clear from the record that the substance of the testimony had 
no bearing upon the trial court's decision." (See Opinion, p.8.) The 
defendant claims that a proffer of evidence was required to establish 
prejudice. This is incorrect. While it is true that the Appellant must 
establish prejudice, a proffer of evidence is not necessarily required. The 
burden requires the Appellant to show that an error occurred and that the 
error was substantial and prejudicial. Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P. 2d 147 
(Utah 1987); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P. 2d 525 (Utah Ct. of 
Appeals, 1990). The Appellate court found, in this case, that an error did 
occur, and that it was substantial and prejudicial. (See Opinion, p. 9, 12.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has already addressed these same issues. 
Dugan v. Jones 615 P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980), clearly shows that the 
Appellate Court reached the correct decision. In Dugan. an expert witness 
was precluded from testifying, and the Supreme Court held that the trial 
court abused its discretion in precluding his testimony. 
The facts of the Dugan case are very similar to the case at bar. On 
January 24, 1978, the trial court held a pre-trial conference, at which it 
was decided that the parties would exchange the names of expert witnesses 
at least 15 days before the trial. A pre-trial order was not submitted, and 
the trial court did not prepare one. The defendants did not submit a 
witness list, and the judge prohibited the defendant's expert witnesses from 
testifying. 
The Supreme Court's decision was clear. "By excluding defendant's 
experts, the court effectively precluded them from proving their case," and 
"(h)ere, as seen, the prejudicial effects of preclusion were severe." Dugan 
615 P. 2d at 1244. The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that 
the trial court's order was never reduced to writing, and that the court 
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could have used means other than exclusion to sanction defendants for their 
noncompliance with the order. 
This case is extremely similar. There was a pre-trial discovery 
conference conducted by the trial court, but a deadline was not set for the 
disclosure of witnesses, and no court order was entered. (See Opinion at 
7.) The trial judge prohibited the plaintiffs' expert witness from testifying. 
The only differences between Dugan and this case are that in this case, no 
deadline was set and the plaintiffs provided a list of witnesses before trial. 
These facts make the plaintiffs' case even stronger. 
The Appellate Court voices the same concerns as the Supreme Court 
in Dugan. The Appellate Court points out that no oral or written order 
was made, Appellate Court Opinion at 9-10, and that the exclusion of 
witnesses is extreme in nature. Appellate Court Opinion at 3-4. The 
plaintiffs violated no order and sanctions were not necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has no compelling reason for the grant of a Writ of 
Certiorari. The only reason the defendant gives is that the Appellate Court 
has drifted far from the norm in judicial procedure. The record and the 
law clearly support the Appellate Court's decision in this case. The 
defendant's request for a Writ of Certiorari should therefore be denied. 
DATED this 3 day of June, 1992. 
ALLEN K. YOUNG 
Attorney for Respondents 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
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Ctefkot-RteCoun 
Utah Goiia ot .Appeals 
Robert Berrett, Gerald 
Argylef et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v* 
Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, 
Inc. , 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 910215-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 3 , 1992) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
Attorneys: Allen K. Young and Randy S. Kester, Springville, for 
Appellant 
Michael F. Richman and Eric C. Olson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant for damages 
suffered as a result of a landslide in Utah County. Defendant 
prevailed at trial. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's decision 
to preclude one of their expert witnesses from testifying. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
BACKGROUND 
On April 13, 1983, a massive landslide began to move down 
the hillside in Spanish Fork Canyon, just downriver of the small 
town of Thistle. The slide progressed into the canyon and 
blocked the Spanish Fork River. A small lake formed that 
inundated and destroyed Thistle. The lake was approximately one 
hundred feet deep and remained for approximately six months until 
the slide was breached and the water receded. The town was 
thereafter designated a flood plain, and no one has been allowed 
to rebuild. Plaintiffs are the former inhabitants of Thistle. 
Plaintiffs claim that the landslide was caused by 
defendant's construction activities at the toe of the slide. In 
the late 1800s, a predecessor railroad made a cut near the toe of 
the slide in order to run its tracks up the canyon. Defendant 
subsequently made a second cut in the early 1900s and a final cut 
in 1951. Plaintiffs estimate that the total soil removed by 
these cuts amounted to between 10,000 and 15,000 cubic yards. In 
essence, plaintiffs claim that but for the cuts made at the toe 
of the slide, the slide would not have occurred, or at least it 
would not have been as massive, and their homes would not have 
been destroyed. 
Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that inasmuch as the 
slide began at the top and moved downward, the landslide would 
have occurred even if the soil had not been removed from the toe. 
Defendant therefore claims that its actions were not the cause of 
the slide. 
Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendant in March 
of 1986. Trial was initially set for August 10, 1987, but was 
continued and set for February 21, 1989. Another continuance set 
trial for August 14, 1989. On June 27, 1989, the trial court 
conducted a pre-trial hearing. Defendant complained that 
plaintiffs had not provided defendant with their final witness 
list in response to its interrogatory.1 The trial court warned 
plaintiffs about their failure to disclose their witnesses, but 
did not set a deadline for the final disclosure of witnesses. At 
the suggestion of defense counsel, the trial court instructed the 
parties to submit a scheduling order and a pre-trial order within 
ten days. No scheduling order was submitted, nor do we have any 
record that one was ever discussed by the parties. No pre-trial 
order was ever submitted because the parties could not agree on 
its content. 
1. The record is replete with accusations from both parties of 
dilatory action by the other side. Suffice it to say that this 
has been a strongly contested lawsuit and this court need not 
assess blame for the delays. We do note, however, that part of 
the delay, as indicated by the trial court, was due to 
defendant's failure to respond fully to plaintiffs' 
interrogatories regarding any other slide-related lawsuits 
against defendant. At the June 27th hearing, plaintiffs were 
still seeking copies of depositions from defendant regarding a 
separate slide-related lawsuit. 
Defendant's counsel indicated to plaintiffs' counsel in a 
letter dated July 12, 1989, that defendant expected plaintiffs' 
final witness list no later than August 1st. Counsel for 
defendant also sent a proposed pre-trial order to plaintiffs' 
counsel. The proposed order indicated that the names of all 
witnesses to be called at trial, not already listed in the 
proposed pre-trial order, be delivered to opposing counsel and 
filed with the trial court at least ten days prior to trial. 
On July 18th and 19th, following the June 27th hearing, 
plaintiffs' counsel met with one of their expert witnesses, Dr. 
Olson, and reviewed reports written about the Thistle slide area. 
Plaintiffs' counsel agreed with Dr. Olson at that time to attempt 
to locate one of the authors, Dr. John F. Shroder, a 
geomorphologist and a recognized expert on the Thistle slide 
area.2 Plaintiffs' counsel contacted Dr. Shroder by telephone 
and concluded that his testimony would be beneficial to 
plaintiffs' case. 
On August 1, 1989, plaintiffs provided defendant with their 
final witness list. Dr. Shroder was included on the list along 
with six other possible witnesses named for the first time. On 
August 3, 1989, defendant moved to exclude the new witnesses, 
including Dr. Shroder. The trial court ordered the exclusion of 
the testimony of Dr. Shroder and any other witnesses not 
disclosed on or before July 11, 1989. 
The plaintiffs' claim was tried to a jury from August 14th 
through August 29th of 1989. At the conclusion of trial, the 
jury rendered a special verdict in favor of defendant. The trial 
court entered judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing all 
claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved for a new 
trial. They now raise several issues on appeal, including 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the 
testimony of expert witness Dr. Shroder. Inasmuch as our 
resolution of this issue demands a new trial, we do not reach the 
remaining allegations of error at trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases 
assigned to their courts. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 16. We 
will not interfere with a trial court's case management unless 
its actions amount to an abuse of discretion. See Duaan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). Excluding a witness from 
2. Dr. Shroder prepared his doctoral thesis on the Thistle slide 
area and published an article discussing the area in 1967. 
testifying is, however, "extreme in nature and . • . should be 
employed only with caution and restraint." Plonkev v. Superior, 
106 Ariz. 310, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (1970). See also Nickev v. 
Brown, 7 Ohio App. 3d 32, 454 N.E.2d 177 (1982) (exclusion is 
severe sanction which should be invoked only to enforce willful 
noncompliance). 
If a trial court erroneously excludes a witness, we will 
reverse if the error was prejudicial to the substantial rights of 
a party. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
It is not always easy to tell when an 
error should be regarded as prejudicial 
. . . . [If] the error appears to be of 
such a nature that it can be said with 
assurance that it was of no material 
consequence in its effect upon the trial 
because reasonable minds would have 
arrived at the same result, regardless of 
such error, it would be harmless and the 
granting of a new trial would not be 
warranted. On the other hand, if it 
appears to be of sufficient moment that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
the absence of such error a different 
result would have eventuated, the error 
should be regarded as prejudicial and 
relief should be granted. Measured by 
such considerations we assay the possible 
effect of the error complained of, 
realizing of course that it is now quite 
impossible to tell definitely whether the 
verdict would have been different. 
[If] we cannot, with any degree of 
assurance, affirm that the use of such 
evidence would not have been helpful to 
the plaintiff, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of allowing him to have 
a full and fair presentation of his cause 
to the jury. 
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 7 Utah 2d 39, 44, 
318 P.2d 330, 333 (1957).3> See also Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P. 2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991) ("an error will be 
harmless if it is *sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings'" (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989)) (emphasis added)). 
ANALYSIS 
Timeliness of Disclosure 
Plaintiffs contend that inasmuch as there was no court order 
mandating disclosure by a certain date, they acted reasonably in 
relying on representations from defendant that August 1, 1989, 
was an acceptable date for submitting the final witness list. In 
3. Contrary to the implication of the dissent in footnote two, 
the supreme court did not alter this standard when the same case 
was appealed a second time in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day 
Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 100, 348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960). The 
case was initially remanded for a new trial with instructions to 
allow the excluded evidence. The jury again found in favor of 
the defendants. A totally new issue was then raised in the 
second appeal, i.e., whether the trial court erred in not giving 
a jury an instruction on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The 
supreme court concluded that the requested instruction was 
properly denied and that no error was made. Prejudice, 
therefore, was not even at issue in the second opinion. The 
supreme court nevertheless stated the following dicta which 
immediately precedes the dicta quoted by the dissent. 
What the parties are entitled to . . . is 
an opportunity for one claiming a 
grievance . . . to present it to a court 
or jury and to have a fair trial. When 
this is done, and the verdict and 
judgment are entered, all presumptions 
are in favor of validity. 
Id. 
In the first Joseph appeal, the supreme court held that the 
plaintiff did not have a fair opportunity to present his case 
because of the improper exclusion of the evidence. There was 
not, therefore, any presumption of validity and any doubt was to 
be resolved in favor of the appellant. In the second case, the 
evidence was admitted, thereby creating the presumption of 
validity. The language quoted in the text, despite its age, 
remains good law as to when we will presume the validity of the 
judgment so as to apply the standard relied upon by the dissent. 
particular, plaintiffs rely upon the July 12th letter referring 
to August 1st as the date defendant expected plaintiffs' final 
witness list. Plaintiffs also assert that their disclosure was 
reasonable inasmuch as it would have been timely under the 
proposed pre-trial order prepared by defendant's counsel 
indicating that new witnesses should be disclosed no later than 
ten days before trial. 
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that despite any 
representations it may have made, plaintiffs were bound by a 
deadline set by the trial court. Cf.. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 
P. 2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988) (trial court had discretion to deny 
motion to continue trial despite parties' separate agreement to 
continue). According to defendant, the trial court set a 
deadline for the disclosure of witnesses when it indicated at the 
June 27th hearing that a pre-trial order was to be prepared 
within ten days. The trial court itself indicated at the August 
3rd hearing on defendant's motion to exclude Dr. Shroder's 
testimony that it "expected" the witnesses to be listed in the 
pre-trial order. 
A trial court's power to sanction a party for failure to 
cooperate in discovery comes from rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which provides that if a party fails to obey 
an order entered under rule 26(f), the court may prohibit the 
offending party from introducing designated matters into 
evidence. Rule 26(f) addresses discovery conferences and directs 
that following a discovery conference the trial court shall enter 
an order "establishing a plan and schedule for discovery." As 
has been recognized by other states,4 the necessary prerequisite 
to the imposition of a sanction is an order that "brings the 
offender squarely within possible contempt of court." Sexton v. 
4. See Clarke v. Sanders, 363 So.2d 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1978) (there was no pretrial order requiring the parties to list 
witnesses on a pretrial statement); Henderson v. Illinois Cent. 
Gulf R.R. Co., 114 111. App. 3d 754, 449 N.E.2d 942 (1983) (a 
violation is a condition precedent to the imposition of a 
sanction); Lindlev v. St. Mary's Hosp., 85 111. App. 3d 559, 406 
N.E.2d 952 (1980) (no order of court or rule of discovery was 
contravened); Fruehauf Trailer Div. v. Thornton, 174 Ind. App. 1, 
3 66 N.E.2d 21 (1977) (no entry of the pre-trial order was made in 
the record before the issue of the disputed expert arose); 
McHenrv v. Hanover Ins. Co., 246 So.2d 374, 377 (La. Ct. App. 
1970) (no formal pre-trial order was entered); Inner City 
Wrecking Co. v. Bilskv, 51 Ohio App. 2d 220, 367 N.E.2d 1214 
(1977) (before a party may be sanctioned, party must be in 
default of an order rendered by the trial court which was 
properly announced and formally entered). 
Sugar Creek Packing Co., 38 Ohio App. 2d 32, 311 N.E.2d 535, 538 
(1973) (absent an order, a party may believe that the court has 
no objection to the information as supplied). See also Whitehead 
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 925-26 (Utah 1990) 
(improper to sanction defendant for not producing test films 
which did not fall within express terms of order). Cf• 8 Charles 
A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Chap. 6 Sanctions § 2289 (Supp. 1991) (federal rule 37(b)(2) 
applies "only if there has already been an order"). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion and the trial court's 
belief, a review of the record reveals that the trial court did 
not set a deadline for witness disclosure at the June 27th 
hearing. While the disclosure of witnesses was discussed at the 
hearing, no motion was before the trial court and no order was 
made establishing a deadline. The trial court itself indicated: 
[T]here's nothing before the court except 
some generalities that you talked about. 
. . . I don't know what else to do with 
you, counsel, except to direct you to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure and have you 
follow it in writing, and that's about 
all I can do. Simply make your motions, 
I'll rule on them as they are presented. 
I have nothing before me today to 
consider. 
Given the trial court's express declaration that it was not 
acting upon any motion at the hearing, the fact that the court 
may have had an unexpressed expectation that the pre-trial order 
would contain the final witness list simply did not impose a 
clear and affirmative deadline on plaintiffs' counsel. 
Defendant's counsel even conceded at the hearing that it had 
not sought the hearing "to get the court to render any orders." 
He simply was seeking to "make this a kind of status conference 
so the court knows where things are going." The trial court then 
admonished the parties to attempt to work things out: 
And if you can't, all I can suggest to 
you, you've got the rules of civil 
procedure, and we'll have to play by the 
book and let the chips fall where they 
may. I hate to see that. Lots of times 
we can accomplish a great deal more by 
cooperation than otherwise. But when 
that fails then we have a rule to fall 
back on . . . . 
So I'm going to direct that whatever 
motions you are going to file that, 
either to compel or any purpose, that we 
ought to have those filed no later than 
ten days from today. 
The parties failed to present either a scheduling order or a 
pre-trial order at the end of the ten-day period. Defendant 
neither filed a motion to compel plaintiffs to disclose their 
final witness list, nor did the trial court enter any order 
establishing any deadlines for the final disclosure of witnesses 
pursuant to the discretion granted to it under rule 26(f). 
The actions of defendant's own counsel belie a claim that a 
deadline was set at the June 27th hearing. Defendant's counsel 
sent a letter on July 12th indicating an August 1st deadline for 
the final disclosure of witnesses. The proposed pre-trial order 
prepared by defendant's counsel, while never agreed to by the 
parties, also provides insight into counsel's understanding of 
the trial court's instructions at the hearing. The proposed 
order indicated that if plaintiffs desired to add new witnesses 
not already listed in the proposed order, then those witnesses 
could be disclosed up until ten days prior to the trial. 
Defendant's counsel now seeks to repudiate these representations 
by simply saying that he did not mean them. Such a repudiation, 
however, is patently unfair to plaintiffs who relied upon those 
representations and would be prejudiced by their withdrawal. 
Defendant, therefore, may not now claim that it had not agreed to 
an August 1st deadline, nor may it assert that it was prejudiced 
or surprised by the timely disclosure on August 1st. See Jansen 
v. Lichwa, 13 Ariz. App. 168, 474 P.2d 1020 (1970) (sanction was 
improper when complaining party consented to continuing discovery 
until trial); cf. Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 925-26 (it was improper 
to exclude test of Jeep CJ-5 for defendant's purported failure to 
comply with discovery order when discovery order only required 
disclosure of tests of Jeep Commandos); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa. 
Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (defendant could not complain of 
prejudice when it requested an expert witness list only 23 days 
before trial). 
Defendant also claims that plaintiffs may not challenge the 
trial court's preclusion of Dr. Shroder's testimony because they 
never adequately proffered Dr. Shroder's testimony under rule 
103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The preclusion of Dr. 
Shroder's testimony, however, was not an evidentiary ruling to 
which rule 103 would apply; it was a case management decision 
under the rules of civil procedure. It is clear from the record 
that the substance of the testimony had no bearing upon the trial 
court's decision. Therefore, any proffer of the substance of Dr. 
Shroder's testimony would have neither benefitted the trial court 
nor caused it to "correct" its decision which is the purpose of 
evidentiary rule 103(1)(2).5 The failure to proffer therefore 
does not preclude an appeal of a case management decision.6 
We hold that absent an order creating a judicially imposed 
deadline,7 a trial court may not sanction a party by excluding 
its witnesses under rule 37(b)(2). See Inner City Wrecking Co. 
v. Bilsky. 51 Ohio App. 2d 220, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (1983) 
(without an order compelling compliance with court rules, the 
sanction imposed by trial court was beyond its authority). The 
5. The dissent asserts that no new trial should be ordered 
because plaintiffs did not object to the exclusion of Dr. Shroder 
until after the trial. The record, however, clearly indicates 
that the plaintiffs objected at the August 3rd hearing. The 
dissent also implies, without any supporting authority, that 
before trial plaintiffs should have sought a writ of mandamus 
ordering the trial court to permit Dr. Shroder to testify. Sound 
judicial policy dictates that we not increase the burden on our 
already over-burdened system by requiring collateral attacks 
during a pending case in order to preserve issues for appeal. 
6. The dissent asserts that plaintiffs could have, and should 
have, used Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal witness. The trial court 
ruled: "I'm not going to permit you to offer the testimony or 
bring out any witnesses that were not designated or known by the 
[sic] July the 11th, 1989." (Emphasis added.) Counsel for 
plaintiffs claims that he understood this to be an absolute bar 
to using Dr. Shroder, either in the case in chief or in rebuttal. 
Given the absolute language used, this was a reasonable 
interpretation. Contrary to the dissent's representation, the 
trial court never indicated otherwise. The language relied upon 
by the dissent in footnote three, which it argues left open the 
possibility of "the testimony" being used in rebuttal, was 
actually spoken in reference to 73 depositions plaintiffs had 
requested permission to use. The trial court told plaintiffs 
they could only use specific passages of the 73 depositions, but 
that any portion of the depositions could be used in rebuttal if 
needed to challenge the veracity of any witness. Given the 
absolute language used by the trial court, we do not fault the 
plaintiffs for not attempting to use Dr. Shroder in rebuttal. 
7. The Utah Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that a 
written order is not statutorily required. Duaan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). In this case, however, we do not 
even have an oral order from the bench. We add our voice to that 
of the supreme court in encouraging the entry of written orders 
so as to reduce the type of confusion that has arisen in this 
case. Id. 
dissent faults us for only considering the trial court's ruling 
under rule 37(b)(2). It asserts that the trial court may have 
excluded Dr. Shroder because plaintiffs proceeded in bad faith. 
Not only does such a speculative conclusion ignore the fact that 
there was no evidence that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith/ it 
misses the thrust of this opinion which is that absent an express 
order of the trial court setting a specific deadline for the 
disclosure of the final witness list, plaintiffs did not act in 
bad faith. 
No order was entered at the June 27th hearing, nor do we 
have any indication that any such order was ever entered relating 
to the August 14th trial date.9 Defendant even conceded that 
there was no scheduling order in place when it moved to exclude 
Dr. Shroder's testimony. By exceeding its procedural authority 
granted by the rules, the trial court abused its discretion. 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 
1991) (stepping outside the arena of discretion is an abuse of 
discretion). 
Prejudice 
As to whether the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Shroder's 
testimony was harmless, we follow the reasoning of the supreme 
8. Plaintiffs' counsel told the trial court that he made the 
decision to call Dr. Shroder in mid-July. The trial court 
clearly believed plaintiffs' counsel should have made the 
decision earlier, but there is no indication that the trial court 
believed the plaintiffs acted in bad faith. In fact, the example 
relied upon by the dissent as an indication of the plaintiffs' 
bad faith, i.e., the late request to use 73 depositions from 
another case, was caused by the defendant. The trial court 
itself expressly blamed defendant, not plaintiffs, for that 
delay. 
9. There was a scheduling order entered prior to the February 
10. 1989, trial date indicating that witness lists were to be 
exchanged on November 15, 1988. That date, however, was 
effectively rendered moot by the continuance of the February 
trial date to August 1989. The trial court indicated at the June 
27th hearing that it had merely anticipated that the earlier 
schedule regarding the February trial date would be 
proportionately applied to the August trial date. Such an 
unexpressed assumption is simply insufficient to create a new and 
binding schedule. See Inner City Wrecking Co., 367 N.E.2d at 
1218 (order must be properly announced and entered before 
sanctions may be imposed). 
court in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital, 318 
P.2d at 334. 
Some indication of the importance of the 
error with which we are here concerned is 
to be found in the fact that counsel 
thought the matter of sufficient 
consequence that he objected to [the 
admission of the evidence]. It strikes 
the writer as being somewhat inconsistent 
that counsel now urges that depriving 
plaintiff of the use of such evidence was 
merely harmless error. If it is so plain 
that it would not have helped plaintiff's 
case, one is led to wonder why counsel 
made the objection and insisted that it 
not be used. The obvious answer seems to 
be that defendant's counsel was actually 
apprehensive that it may have a 
substantial effect against his client. 
Of course, he could not be sure, nor can 
we. 
In view of the fact that there is such 
substantial doubt that we cannot, with 
any degree of assurance, affirm that the 
use of such evidence would not have been 
helpful to the plaintiff, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of allowing 
him to have a full and fair presentation 
of his cause to the jury. 
At the August 3rd pre-trial hearing, defendant strongly 
objected to allowing Dr. Shroder to testify at trial. At that 
time, defendant was aware of Dr. Shroder's article and his 
geomorphological credentials. Defendant also knew that Dr. 
Shroder was being offered as a witness to support plaintiffs' 
contentions that the defendant's actions at the toe of the slide 
contributed to the slide. At trial, defendant argued that its 
geomorphology experts were more credible than plaintiffs' 
geotechnical engineering experts. Dr. Shroder's testimony as a 
geomorphologist, which would have indicated that the slide was 
caused by defendant's cuts at the toe of the slide, would have 
directly contradicted defendant's geomorphologists' conclusion 
that the slide started at the top. 
Given defendant's own emphasis on the type of experts 
presented, we cannot say that the geomorphological credentials 
and testimony of Dr. Shroder would not have been helpful to the 
plaintiffs' case in this battle of expert witnesses. In 
JACKSON, Judge, dissenting: 
Because I do not think the plaintiffs have met their burden 
of establishing substantial prejudice, I respectfully dissent 
from the majority's decision to reverse and remand. 
Even if I were persuaded that the trial court's action in 
excluding Dr. Shroder from testifying was an abuse of 
discretion,1 the plaintiffs still must establish that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the result at trial would have been 
different without his testimony. Batt v. State, 28 Utah 2d 417, 
503 P.2d 855, 859 (Utah 1972); Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western R.R. , 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah 1955). "No 
error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 61. Absent any showing by plaintiffs that the outcome would 
have differed, every reasonable presumption as to the validity of 
the verdict below must be taken as true upon appeal. Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). 
The majority opinion ignores the language of Rule 61 and the 
cases which have interpreted that rule as placing the burden on 
the complaining party to establish substantial prejudice, and 
instead relies upon a 1957 case for the proposition that if we 
1. However, the majority's reliance upon Rule 37(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in reaching this conclusion is 
misplaced. I agree with the majority that the trial court had 
not entered an order regarding discovery, and that therefore, no 
discovery order was violated. See Henderson v. Illinois Cent. 
Gulf R.R., 449 N.E.2d 942, 944 (111. 1983) (no order for 
discovery so court could not sanction for discovery violation). 
But the trial court did not cite Rule 37(b) as justification for 
excluding the Shroder testimony. The trial court stated that 
because plaintiffs admitted having known about the witnesses "a 
long time ago" and had failed to designate who they were, those 
witnesses would be excluded from testifying. 
It is just as conceivable that the trial court decided to 
exclude the testimony because it felt plaintiffs had consistently 
proceeded in bad faith in preparing for trial. On August 1, 
fourteen days before the twelve-day trial was to commence, 
plaintiffs disclosed they intended to call an additional seventy-
eight witnesses (through live testimony or deposition). The 
trial court excluded the testimony of only three of these 
witnesses. The trial court then ordered plaintiffs to designate 
what portions of the 75 depositions they intended to read, but 
did not exclude this testimony. 
that plaintiff objected to the exclusion of the Shroder 
testimony. 
Plaintiffs in this case have failed to provide this court 
with any basis for declaring that the trial court's exclusion of 
Shroder's testimony was prejudicial to the extent that without 
the exclusion, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different.5 Because plaintiffs fail 
to meet this burden, their contention is without merit. See 
Ashton, 733 P.2d at 154. I would affirm the trial court, and 
thus dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial 
court and remand for a new trial. 
4. (...continued) 
to them, nor did they attempt to introduce Shroder's testimony on 
rebuttal. 
Further, the trial court's ruling in this case could not 
have been as unexpected as plaintiffs would have us believe. At 
a hearing on June 27, the trial court warned the parties that if 
they did not disclose their witnesses, it would make an order 
that they could not testify. 
5. See Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1988) 
(Zimmermann, J. concurring) (any error by trial court in 
excluding evidence was not shown to have "sufficiently undermined 
the outcome"); Redevelopment Agency v. Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 
(Utah 1987) (even if it is determined on appeal that a trial 
court erred, "we must also consider whether or not the error was 
prejudicial"); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987) 
(appellant must establish "not only that an error occurred, but 
that it was substantial and prejudicial in that appellant was 
deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the 
disputed issues by the jury"); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 
P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990) ("Even if we assume that the 
admission of [the expert's] testimony constituted error, 
plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced. Any error 
in the admission of evidence must be disregarded unless it 
substantially affects the substantial rights of the parties."); 
cf. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 
(Utah 1990) (cumulative effect of trial court's errors in 
excluding evidence substantially prejudiced defendants' rights); 
Kott v. City of Phoenix, 158 Ariz. 415, 763 P.2d 235 (1988) 
(trial court's decision to allow officer to testify who had been 
unidentified to other side before trial was reversible error 
since admission of evidence was erroneous and error not 
harmless). 
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Springville, Utah 84663 
Re: 
Dear Allen: 
D&RGW adv. 3errett, et al. 
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation 
of July 11 and 12, 1989. I advised you that Jim Ozment will be 
the Railroad's representative at trial^ and that he will be 
present throughout the trial. You advised me Chat, contrary to 
your previous statements, you now wished to review Mr; Ozment's 
photographs. I informed you of Mr. Ozment's position that he 
would produce photographs only if served with a subpoena. I 
offered to approach him about abandoning this requirement. I 
subsequently advised you that I had spoken further with Mr. 
Ozment "and he has agreed to make the photographs available on 
July 31, 1989 in Denver, Colorado. 
You requested copies of the materials promised at Dr. 
Morgenstem's deposition. Copies of these are being made and 
will be forwarded shortly. We agreed to exchange exhibit lists 
no later than August 1, 1989. At that time, you will also 
supply us with your final witness list including the identity 
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of any depositions that you propose Co read. As we have 
previously discussed, within two days of receiving your list, 
we will provide you with our final witness list. You advised 
me that, as of July 12, 1989, you had not identified with 
certainty those witnesses that you plan to call whose names do 
not appear in the latest draft of the pretrial order. 
I confirmed the dates of July 19, and 21, 1989 
respectively for the termination of the depositions of 31aine 
Leonard and Joseph Olsen. Larry Hansen will be available at 
the completion of Mr. Leonard's deposition for you to depose. 
George 3eckwith will be deposed on August 3, 1989 in your 
offices. 
As to the interrogatories that you deem to remain 
unanswered, I agreed to identify specifically the portions of 
the Utah Railway materials that are responsive. The answers to 
Interrogatories Nos. 15 through 17 relating to Mr. Ueblacker 
are found in Exhibits 1 through 32 to Mr. Ueblacker1s Utah 
Railway deposition. He identified those exhibits as the 
entirety of his correspondence with and work produced for the 
Railroad. As to Interrogatory No. 14, the requested insurance 
information (except for the actual prior policy) is set forth 
in the answer to Interrogatory No. 13 of the Railroad's Answers 
to the Utah Railway's First Set of Interrogatories dated 
January 16, 1984. You contend that Interrogatory No. 2 
requests the production of documents but it says nothing about 
documents. Finally, with respect to Interrogatory No. 20, 
there was no "job authorization" prepared to employ Shannon and 
Wilson. 
On the issue of the Pretrial Order, you indicated that 
you are preparing a new draft. I requested that you not alter 
those portions of the previous draft that set forth the 
Railroad's contentions and the issues of fact and law that the 
Railroad placed in the draft. I look forward to receiving your 
new draft. 
ECO:sw 
cc: Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
